Buffalo Law Review
Volume 67

Number 3

Article 16

5-1-2019

What’s the Point of the Rule of Law?
Martin Krygier

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Martin Krygier, What’s the Point of the Rule of Law?, 67 Buff. L. Rev. 743 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol67/iss3/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Buffalo Law Review
VOLUME 67

MAY 2019

NUMBER 3

What’s the Point of the Rule of Law?
MARTIN KRYGIER†
‘Domination is resilient because it is always captured by the most
powerful forces in a society, be they forces of state or private power
or the military-industrial complex.
Power therefore must be tempered every which way’.
–John Braithwaite, ‘Hybrid politics for justice,’ 25.

‘Tempering power” is not a new or unusual phrase but it
attracts little investment, carries little freight, and at least
under that name is not (yet!) an academic subject. By
contrast, “the rule of law” draws multi-billion dollar
investments,1 is overladen with ideological and theoretical
baggage, and is now a subject in many fields, among them:
law, philosophy, political science, and economics. Its surge to

† This paper had its origins in my unpublished 2017 Dennis Leslie Mahoney Prize
Lecture, ‘Re-Imagining the Rule of Law’ delivered to the Julius Stone Institute of
Jurisprudence, University of Sydney Law School, September 7, 2017. It came to
take its present form at the Baldy Center’s 40th Annual Conference, ‘Tempering
Power,’ on November 9–10, 2018, and was tweaked in presentations at the Law
Schools of the universities of Wrocław and Kraków, the Archiwum Osiatynskiego,
Warsaw, and the Albert Hirschman Center on Democracy, The Graduate
Institute, Geneva. I am grateful to participants in all those events, and
particularly to my commentator at the Baldy Center, Guyora Binder, and to John
Braithwaite, with whom I had numerous conversations on common themes over
the years, and particularly in the months after the Baldy conference.
1. A 2010 estimate was 2.7 billion USD per year. See Ronald Janse, A Turn
to Legal Pluralism in Rule of Law Promotion, 2013 ERASMUS L. REV. 181, 182.
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Over the last thirty years, as virtually every article on
the rule of law begins by noting, it has come to be invoked
pretty well everywhere.2 Once a phrase that only lawyers
used with confidence, whether misplaced or not, now
everyone is on to it. So much so that, whereas “tempering
power” has a vocal constituency of two (Braithwaite,
Krygier), the rule of law has come to join those elevated –
“iconic” I guess we’d say today - terms whose contrary has
virtually no voice at all. Like democracy, equality, liberty,
and justice, it is much abused in practice, but rarely by name.
It wasn’t always so, but nowadays the most unlikely
regimes have come to claim to be honoring the rule of law,
however implausible their boasts might be. Sinister talk of
“the rule of law with Chinese characteristics” or in Vietnam
with “socialist characteristics” shows the lingering power of
the phrase. And hear Robert Mugabe explain that “[o]nly a
government that subjects itself to the rule of law has any
moral right to demand of its citizens obedience to the rule of
law.”3
Governments apart, the rule of law has become a cliché
of choice among international organisations of every kind. At
a global development conference ten years ago, I heard a
senior development economist announce that “it’s the law
stupid,”4 perhaps to the consternation of some of his peers
who thought it was still the economy. There seems no end in
sight to the money spent on rule of law promotion,
notwithstanding a less than glorious record of success. Once,
2. Indeed, that is true of every article I have written on the subject as well.
See Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law after the Short Twentieth Century:
Launching a Global Career, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF ROGER COTTERRELL 327 passim (Richard Nobles & David Schiff eds., 2014).
3. B. Z. TAMANAHA, ON
(2004).

THE

RULE

OF

LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 2

4. Ninth Annual Global Development Network Conference (Jan. 27– Feb. 2,
2008).
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the rule of law was not something that anyone but lawyers
spoke of, still less wasted money on; now all sorts of folks are
eager to do both. Economists recommend it as necessary for
economic development; democrats as integral to their
projects; constitutionalists as another name for the business
they are in; those who essay to repair “failed,” “post-conflict,”
“post-dictatorial,” and “transitional” states carry rule of law
promotional toolkits into the field. A bunch of outfits – the
World Justice Project, the Heritage Foundation, Freedom
House, the World Bank, the United Nations and others, have
developed “rule of law indicators,” which claim to assess the
state of the rule of law around the globe. The indicators differ
from outfit to outfit and what they actually tell us about the
rule of law rather than about the agendas of those who
purport to measure it is unclear,5 but they’re everywhere.
Today, however, while what I have just said remains
true, we might be entering a new phase. The rule of law is
being assaulted in fact if not by name, by new foes in new
ways, many of them apparently lawful: the rule of law is
subverted, ostensibly according to the rules. Recent
developments in Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere have
raised disturbing questions about the conditions and nature
of the rule of law and of threats to it. Partisans of the ideals
of the rule of law are called on not merely to praise those
ideals, or promote them, but defend them against
determined attack. And as the magnetic post-communist
appeal of liberal-democracy (“the end of history”) appears to
be eroding in many parts of the globe, there may well come
to be a backlash against rule of law promotion wherever that
chafes or falters; and it chafes and falters often and in many
places.
I come to praise the rule of law, not to bury it. Yet that is
not an unproblematic task. While the idea is too important
to reject or ignore, as thrown around in contemporary

5. See Mila Versteeg & Tom Ginsburg, Measuring the Rule of Law: A
Comparison of Indicators, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 100–137 (2017).
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discussions, it is too confused and confusing to guide. If it is
to be revived, it needs to be re-imagined. What follows is an
attempt at such re-imagining. The first two sections identify
and criticise some common underlying features of
conventional accounts of the rule of law: Part 1 characterises
elements that those features share, and Part II outlines six
reasons not to start, still less to end, with them. The rest of
the paper develops an alternative account. Part III suggests
that we do better to start with consideration of the point, the
telos of the rule of law, rather than with enumeration of
purported elements, the anatomy of it. Since the rule of law
is typically seen as a response to a problem, often described
as arbitrary power, Part IV attempts to say what sort of a
problem that is and why it has so often been regarded as
problematic. Part V considers existing accounts of the
character of a solution to that problem, and Part VI seeks to
explain why the metaphor of tempering power well captures
some of the character of such a solution. That I take to be the
appropriate animating ideal for the rule of law. Part VII
sketches some expansive implications of that ideal. It
suggests that it should be understood as an inherently social
and political ideal, not merely an ideal for law.
I. WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?
It is old wisdom (Miles’s law) that where people stand
depends on where they sit. With the rule of law, what they
“under-stand” it to be seems to follow a similar rule. Lawyers
sit in law offices, legal academics in law schools, judges in
courts, and legal philosophers spend their sitting time
reading lawyers, legal academics, judges, and other legal
philosophers. That is as it should be, but its effects on how
the rule of law has come to be understood by its new and
wider audience are not always salutary.
For lawyers, sitting where they do, the rule of law is a
virtue of the law. The rule of law—to the extent it is
manifest—inheres in a state’s legal order, with its official
agencies, rules, procedures, practices and outputs. Typically
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that’s where lawyers start and almost as often it’s where they
stay.
So, in the case of the rule of law, even though lawyers,
legal philosophers, rule of law promoters, and others differ
greatly over specifics, underlying their differences is an
assumption so shared, so assumed that it is never explicitly
discussed, namely that the phrase speaks of virtues internal
to the state’s legal apparatus and ways of doing things. It has
to do above all with the character of official legal institutions,
rules and practices, features taken to be necessary for a legal
order to be in good shape, to accord with the rule of law.
There are many such accounts, but they all have in common
this centering of the state of legislatures and courts, the
character of the rules they make and apply, the behaviour of
the legally authorised agencies that enforce them.
Differences among lawyers’ accounts are about what subcategorisations of that official legal complex are key.
Thus, the most influential Anglo lawyers’ account, that
of A.V. Dicey, focuses on the distinctive role of the courts (and
also administrators) in common law countries, the only ones
he concedes to be blessed with this asset. Different in detail
but the same in domain, one of the most influential
contemporary philosophical accounts, that advanced by Lon
Fuller of Harvard and developed by Joseph Raz of Oxford
(and before them both, by Jeremy Bentham),6 focuses
primarily on the formal character of legal rules, on aspects of
legal craftsmanship—publicity, clarity, non-contradiction,
prospectivity, coherence, etc.—that might make law
predictable and allow the law to guide citizens and to treat
them with respect (a point taken further by Jeremy Waldron,
who focuses on procedures courts should offer anyone
brought before them).7 Morally ambitious, “thick” theories,

6. Timothy Endicott, Arbitrariness 5 (U. Oxford Legal Res. Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 2/2014, 2014) (discussing works by Jeremy Bentham).
7. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure 3-31
(N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 10-73, 2010).
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such as Ronald Dworkin’s or Lord Bingham’s, do differ from
“thin” accounts that speak just of institutions and rules in
their concern with the moral content of legal rules and
judgments, but not in where they expect the rule of law to be
found, where its sources lie.
There are plenty of sub-variants of these accounts, and
alternatives as well to choose from, but they all start from
the shared assumptions discussed above. Indeed, as Jeremy
Waldron wryly observes, “There is a tradition of trying to
capture the essence of the Rule of Law in a laundry list of
principles: Dicey had three, John Rawls four, Cass Sunstein
came up with seven, Lon Fuller had eight, Joseph Raz eight,
John Finnis eight, Lord Bingham eight in his excellent book
on The Rule of Law. (I don’t know why eight is the magic
number: but it’s a slightly different eight in each case);
Robert Summers holds the record, I think, with eighteen
Rule of Law principles.”8 (Bentham had seven, very similar
to the eight of Fuller and Raz). Undaunted, Waldron adds yet
another list (ten principles) which while differing in
important detail and moral rationale, shares, as I have
argued elsewhere, exactly the same underlying assumption.9
Not only lawyers think this way. For obvious reasons,
their views and accounts have disproportionate influence.
After all it’s the rule of law we’re talking about, so many
people take it to be obvious that law must take the lead, that
the rule of law has to do with the characteristics of official
legal institutions etc., and that lawyers, as the experts in
that domain, are the ones from whom lay people should take
their cues. Moreover, once the rule of law became something
to be “built” by the deliberate concentrated efforts of an
industry of RoL (Rule of Law) promoters in countries that
never had it or have been denied it or where it is judged to
8. Jeremy Waldron, Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law 3 (N.Y.U. Pub. L.
& Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011).
9. Martin Krygier, Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law, in IN PURSUIT OF
PLURALIST JURISPRUDENCE 294 passim (Nicole Roughan & Andrew Halpin eds.,
2017); Waldron, supra note 7 at 3-31.
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be in poor shape, the obvious source of enlightenment has
seemed to be the experts. And they beget the new industry of
promoter-experts.
I don’t propose to add to these lists. There are so many
available—“the rule of law is a, b, c; or x, y, z”—they can’t all
be right. More important, if you want to know which if any
account ultimately to prefer then, quite apart from the
details of any particular one, it seems to me a deep mistake
to start as they all do, by specifying purported legal
institutional components or even their required moral
content. My reasons for this belief are both practical and
conceptual. I start with practice and in Parts III to VI move
to concepts.
II. AGAINST RECIPES
Examined more closely, the assumption shared by the
various accounts I have mentioned, and those many
influenced by them and engaging with them, has two core
elements. One is that we are in a position to stipulate in
terms that apply generally and often in detail, what
institutions, rules, and procedures add up to or will deliver
the rule of law. The other is that these ingredients are to be
found in the activities and products of the formal legal
institutions of states. “Ingredients” is a good word here, for
these accounts so often read like institutional recipes for a
somewhat elusive feast. I don’t think we should rely on, still
less start from, such recipes for at least six reasons.
First, legal and institutional forms often vary more and
change more rapidly than certain perennial social and
political problems which the rule of law has been invoked to
deal with. Second, and conversely, many new problems arise
for which old prescriptions have little helpful to offer. Third,
much effort to cook up the rule of law by following
established legalistic recipes is spectacularly and predictably
ineffective. Fourth, and one reason for ineffectiveness,
conventional accounts pay very little attention to the
complex nature of social causality in conventional accounts.
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Often the usual lawyers’ suspects aren’t where many of the
problems the rule of law is hoped to alleviate occur, nor are
conventional legal ingredients always likely solutions, and
even when they are, they depend on social realities and
forces that central legal agencies only ever partially control.
Fifth, the very legal forms chosen and crafted to generate the
rule of law can be complicit, indeed helpful, in its abuse. And
sixth, if you want to explain to non-lawyers why any of this
matters, they are unlikely to follow your explications of
institutional detail, controversies about legality and
constitutionality and so on, or at least they are unlikely to
follow you very far without asking: but what’s the point? That
seems to me a very good question to ask. Taking these
challenges to legal laundry lists (or recipe books; take your
pick: are they adequate to keep you clean, or well fed?) in
turn:
First, institutional variety. Institutions change and
differ. They do so over time and from place to place. The
institutions that occurred to Aristotle to distinguish “the rule
of law” from “that of any individual” were not those specified
in Magna Carta; those had little in common with the ones
that drew Montesquieu; what he lit upon was different from
Dicey’s homegrown selection; these from Hayek’s; those from
Oakeshott’s; his from Fuller’s; his (though not so much) from
Raz’s; any of theirs from Waldron’s; his from those chosen by
rule of law indexers; theirs from each other.
Not only do such institutions and practices differ; they
are bound to since the circumstances in which they operate,
the problems they are called upon to deal with, their
capacities, the institutional practices, conventions,
traditions and options from which they draw, differ hugely
over time and place.10 They are affected, too, by vast
differences and changes—cultural, religious, demographic,

10. See Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, Political Morality, and History: Explaining
the Enduring Resonance of the Hart-Fuller Debate, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1072–
78 (2008).
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economic, and technological—between societies, within
them, and over time. The modern state thinks differently
from other states, for example, and does different things in
different ways. Different things are thinkable and much is
doable and done by states, for better and worse, that has
never been done or doable before. So even if your concern is
with one very old problem, for example, arbitrary power,
specific ways of dealing it are unlikely to be those
recommended by Aristotle.
Second, new problems. Among the things that have
varied and changed dramatically over time and place are
specific kinds and sources of challenge to the rule of law, and
what might be effective responses to them. This was always
true, and it is arguably never more true than today when so
much that impinges on huge populations changes so fast, and
in so many unpredictable ways, that much of it is likely to
elude traditional institutional devices and practices. I
mention only two examples I barely understand: bitcoin and
Facebook. There will be many more. So a search for an
identikit package of institutions and practices to deal with
emerging problems will often not take us far, or far back.
Third, ineffectual promotion. These first two facts
are often overlooked by rule of law promotion programs,
replete as they are with costly, prolonged, and labourintensive endeavours to transplant particular features of
legal, state, institutions, forms, conventions, practices—that
are supposed to secure what we take to be the rule of law in
First World countries thought to have it, and that are then
‘installed’ in, usually other world, countries thought to need
it. These endeavors have been rightly accused of, sorry for
the fancy language, “isomorphic mimicry . . . adopting the
camouflage of organisational forms that are successful
elsewhere to hide their actual dysfunction.” As these authors
point out of much development assistance more generally,
rule of law promotion “conflates[] . . . form and function . . .
one of the most ubiquitous but pernicious mistakes of
development policy over the last sixty years, and is manifest
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most clearly in widespread implementation failure.”11
Institutions and rules are shipped or copied, but the
outcomes expected do not eventuate. Does one then have the
rule of law because the institutions appear to be in place, or
lack it because nothing works as it should?
Should we say we have achieved the rule of law when we
have built courts, installed computers, and trained judges,
but no one visits them and, more important, they have little
effect on what goes on in the wider society?12 Or what should
we conclude when the efforts of so-called rule of law or
human rights–focused law reformers to train judges and
build courthouses in Sudan, to enlist and reform the law in
the service of the poor, turn out not to do much of that but
rather legitimise the power of a dictatorship that is “already
accustomed to using any available legal tools and resources
for political gain?”13 Have they installed the rule of law, or
have they simply issued their best guess about what might
serve rule of law values, which turns out not to? Or has what
they have done got anything to do with the rule of law at all?
These examples can readily be multiplied.
When legal institutional tinkering fails to prevent havoc,
when people who count ignore the law and those who don’t
merely suffer it, the rule of law is in very poor shape if it
exists at all, whatever the laws look like, and commonly that
should not have been a surprise. On their own, the legal
institutional features so often identified with the rule of law
are not up to the task. Indeed, on their own they never are,
but always need supporting circumstances, social and
political structures and cultural supports, which are not
always available and are difficult to engineer.

11. Lant Pritchett et al., Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent
Implementation Failure 2 (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 234, 2010).
12. See generally THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN (Whit Mason ed., 2011).
13. MARK FATHI MASSOUD, LAW’S FRAGILE STATE: COOLONIAL, AUTHORITARIAN,
LEGACIES IN SUDAN 206 (2013).

AND HUMANITARIAN
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Fourth, causality: social, crucial, and complicated.
We should not be surprised that rule of law promotion is
often disappointing. It is intrinsically hard, and it doesn’t
help that we are often looking in the wrong way at the wrong
things.
I have already mentioned the banal truth that lawyers
take the rule of law to be all about law. In numerous
writings,14 I have also sought to recall what should also be
treated as banal, but is not often a matter of reflection in
writings about the rule of law, what might be called the social
face or dimension of the rule of law. Many of the major
threats to rule of law values come from beyond the state—
think Facebook and Al Q’aida; many responses to such
threats will also need to be found outside the state and its
laws—think media and civil society; and even where the
state and law are important or relevant, their significance
depends on complex chains of social causality, including the
presence, absence, power, character, of social agencies and
currents that the law can never completely control. In some
circumstances, such agents and media of social causality
support the efforts of state law; in others they undermine it;
in many places both support and undermining take place.
The tunnel vision of rule of law legalism is not terribly
illuminating here.
Fifth, institutional complicity. In recent years new
concepts have entered the lexicon of observers of
constitutional
politics,
among
them
“abusive
constitutionalism,”
“stealth
constitutionalism,”
and
“constitutional coups.”15 The lexicon develops to try to
14. Most recently, Krygier, supra passim note 9; Martin Krygier, The Rule of
Law and State Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY: THE STATE AND BEYOND 106 passim
(Wojciech Sadurski et al. eds., 2019).
15. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189
passim (2013); Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545
passim (2018); Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Coups in EU Law, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 446 passim (Maurice Adams et al. eds.,
2017); Grażyna Skąpska, Znieważający Konstytucjonalizm i Konstytucjonalizm
Znieważony: Refleksja Socjologiczna na Temat Kryzysu Liberalno-
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capture some distinctive ways many modern authoritarian
regimes use law to undermine rule of law values. Thus, the
American scholar, David Landau, presciently analysed what
he
termed
“abusive
constitutionalism.”
Old-style
authoritarians often staged coups, but that has become
considerably less fashionable, and instead has often been
replaced by a:
rash of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as
Hungary, Egypt, and Venezuela [that have] shown that the tools of
constitutional amendment and replacement can be used by wouldbe autocrats to undermine democracy with relative ease. Since
military coups and other blatant ruptures in the constitutional
order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the
constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make
themselves difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and
other accountability institutions. The resulting regimes continue to
have elections and are not fully authoritarian, but they are
significantly less democratic than they were previously. 16

Landau’s article appeared in 2013, and the rash has not
stopped spreading. Add Turkey and Poland to the list; the
USA is being tested as we speak. Legal institutions and
others are taken over and/or rendered supine by an
authoritarian government, in deliberate and comprehensive
violation of the rule of law, though often with the aid of the
existing law. This is not the first time that people need to be
reminded of the distinction, and often distance, between the
existence of any particular legal institutions, on the one
hand, and closeness to the ideal of the rule of law, on the
other.
The problem of bending often well-intentioned
institutions to ill-intentioned interests extends beyond
populist politicians. As John Braithwaite has shown,
powerful interests, whether political, economic, military, or
social, often have the resources and can hire the skills to
Demokratycznego Konstytucjonalizmu w Europie Pokomunistycznej, 7 FILOZOFIA
PUBLICZNA I EDUKACJA DEMOKRATYCZNA 276 passim (2018); Ozan O. Varol,
Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673 passim (2015).
16. Landau, supra passim note 15.
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“game” systems of rule, particularly in complex
circumstances where instability is common and the stakes
are high, if the legal order insists on legalistic
punctiliousness and does not allow exploration of the
purposes and principles that underlie the rules.17 Indeed, an
implication of his argument is that it is possible that in
circumstances of complexity, stability, and high stakes, legal
rules closest to fashionable formal laundry lists are
particularly open to being gamed.
Sixth, pointlessness. It is easy for professionals in any
sphere to be so caught up in internal complexities that they
forget, or fail to communicate to outsiders, what is at stake
in their technical discussions. Not to mention that they often
won’t know what’s at stake. That is true at the level of
analysis—one should always be in a position to know why
something you are doing, presumably for some reason,
matters. It is also true at a very practical level, so one can
avoid that disease of which bureaucrats are commonly
accused: goal displacement. They can tell you what the rules
require, but not why. Eventually, often, they themselves
forget why; though they don’t forget the rules! So my advice
is to start elsewhere: by asking not what the rules of the rule
of law are but what its point is.
This is not merely an issue of academics finding it hard
to express their profound and arcane mysteries in language
simple enough for laypeople to understand. It goes deeper.
Many people who stand most in need of the ideal of the rule
of law have good reason to think we are starting and stopping
in the wrong place if we confine our attention to the usual
suspects of rule of law enthusiasts, the internal workings of
legal institutions, the formal attributes of rules, the
procedural configurations of high criminal courts. For most
people in most places, these are not where they are ever
17. See John Braithwaite, Hybrid Politics for Justice: The Silk Road for
Restorative Justice II, 5 RESTORATIVE JUST. 7 passim (2017); John Braithwaite,
Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 47
passim (2002).
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likely to feel either the strengths or the weaknesses of the
rule of law. But there are many other places where they
might value the former and lament the latter.
Many of the world’s populations endure political orders
(and disorders) where the central institutions of law are far
from central in the society. Other forces matter more. At the
other end of the scale—there are many points in between and
often over time ends come to meet—the state really does
matter, so much so that nothing—least of all law, however
handsomely configured and appointed—gets in its way.
Billions live close to one of these ends or the other; often a
single human life will have to endure both. Where so, if
citizens demand the rule of law,18 I surmise, their pleas are
likely to have less to do with the formal character of legal
rules, or internal workings of institutions and practices
(though these are often not irrelevant to the relatively few
who reach them) than lawyers in rule-of-law rich countries
are likely to find familiar. Pressed for their thoughts on the
rule of law, I surmise again, those citizens’ concerns will only
occasionally overlap with what concerned Lord Bingham in
his well-selling volume of that title,19 an admirable if entirely
conventional internal lawyer’s characterisation of what the
rule of law amounts to (in the United Kingdom and other
similarly privileged countries), recommended for the world.
For the fundamental concerns in societies where the rule of
law is notable by its absence20 and/or by the presence of
ambitions for power antithetical to any that animate it,21
here a third surmise, are likely to be whether and in what
ways those who wield power that can hurt are free to do what
they like, in ways we have good reasons not to like. To the
extent citizen/subjects think of law in such societies they

18. See, e.g., NICK CHEESMAN, OPPOSING THE RULE OF LAW: HOW MYANMAR’S
COURTS MAKE LAW AND ORDER passim (2012).
19. Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67 passim (2007).
20. See The Rule of Law in Afghanistan, supra passim note 12.
21. See CHEESMAN, supra passim note 18.
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might be pleased, but are likely to be surprised, if powerwielders have to reckon with law at all, for that’s not their
experience or expectation. If law is taken to matter at all, it
is often more naturally to be thought of as part of an arsenal
that rulers either wield or regard as irrelevant to what they
are able to do, sometimes one, sometimes the other. In such
places, that is, much of the world, it is not a local assumption
that the powerful need to reckon with the law, even if the
unpowerful might have to. And what might be needed to
satisfy the latter’s yearnings that things might be otherwise
in their societies at this time are unlikely to be found in
Bingham’s book, or indeed most of the literature by first
world lawyers that purports to characterise the fundamental
nature and ingredients of the rule of law.
The vulnerabilities, aspirations, and values that lead
people to clamor for the rule of law are not primarily to be
judged by what it does for lawyers, still less legal
philosophers. If the rule of law is a good, it is a social good,
and it is challenged, inter alia, by social bads. If Afghan
citizens, for example, or Syrians or . . ., lament the absence
of the rule of law in their societies, is it obvious that they are
talking only about receiving unclear legal messages from the
government (Fuller), or having a hard day in court
(Waldron)? Perhaps the irrelevance of the law or any other
institutional constraints, to the ways power is experienced in
their everyday lives, might matter to them more
immediately, and even more, than their (likely rare)
appearances before judicial tribunals (where they exist).
I conclude from these multiple misadventures of
legalistic, institutional, fixations, that you can only work out
what the rule of law needs to be made up of, after you think
about what it might be for. We need at least to consider
whether the values that animate concern with the rule of law
might need and draw support from other than the usual
institutional suspects, as well as whether there might be
other conditions for, and alternatives to, effective state-law
contributions to that putatively charmed state of affairs. In
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seeing these contributions and conditions and challenges
more clearly, we might have to reconsider the role and
contributions of state law to the rule of law, more has been
common. But to do that we should start by considering what
we want them to do.
III. LET’S START AGAIN
Considerations such as these have led me to argue for
some time that, apart from difficulties with identifying the
rule of law in the world, and perhaps contributing to them,
we are often hindered by the way we, and particularly the
lawyer defenders of the realm, commonly approach the rule
of law. For it is not a thing like a stone we might stumble on
or over, but a complex practical ideal. It is complex, because
a lot is needed even to approximate it and that lot changes;
it is practical because it is neither a natural fact nor a
Utopian fantasy but a goal intended to be made good (even if
only partially) in the real world, and it is an ideal rather than
a simple description. The concept is normative, the condition
supposed to be valuable. We need things in the world to
achieve it, but surely what we need will depend on what we
want to achieve, as well as on the conditions and
circumstances in which we seek to achieve it. Three ways of
thinking about our subject are commonly muted, where they
are not missing altogether from legal/operational/
technocratic ways of thought: one is as a matter for political
morality, a second as a question needing sociological
imagination, and the third as a fundamentally political
achievement. I will take them in turn: the first in this and
the next three sections; the second in Part VI and the third
in the final Part, VII.
First, political morality. The rule of law incorporates an
ideal, and one of a particular kind, nicely captured by Jeremy
Waldron’s notion of a “solution-concept.” Waldron comments,
Perhaps there is no exemplar of the Rule of Law, but just a problem
that has preoccupied us for 2,500 years: how can we make law rule?
On this account, the Rule of Law is a solution-concept, rather than
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an achievement concept, the concept of a solution to a problem we’re
not sure how to solve; and rival conceptions are rival proposals for
solving it or rival proposals for doing the best we can in this regard
given that the problem is insoluble. 22

I will question Waldron’s rendition of the nature of the
problem in a moment, but I think the notion of rule of law as
a solution-concept is spot-on. And if it is, the first question
we need to ask, before we purport to identify the solution, is
what’s the problem?
Even if you reject my particular answer to that question,
I would still want to insist that that question must be the one
to start with. Starting with legal institutional checklists
constrains thought and blocks imagination. Familiar
features of legal rules or institutions, so often those that just
happen to be taken to embody the rule of law in our own time
and place, come to be thought of as default settings for its
achievement, even as necessary settings. That can tie us
simply to what we happen to know, rather than allow us to
explore whether there are other ways of getting where we
want to go. It makes it hard to think either that the rule of
law might be served in the absence of familiar legal
hardware, or indeed of it being disserved even where the
hardware is present. And it often leads, as I mentioned
above, to goal displacement. A predicament looms, that has
been so aptly noted of the whole rule of law promotion
industry—“we know how to do a lot of things, but deep down
we don’t really know what we’re doing.”23 So I recommend
that we start by considering the point or end of the
enterprise, not the means, the why before the what.
IV. WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Well, why? What is the rule of law problem? As we saw,
Waldron suggests that “the problem that has preoccupied us
22. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?, 21 L. & Phil. 137, 158 (2002).
23. THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 15 (2006).
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over the last 2,500 years [is] how can we make law rule?”, but
surely that doesn’t push the question back far enough. We
would only ask that question if we thought making law rule
was good for something. Otherwise, why bother? Why should
we want the law to rule? Just for its own sake? For the sake
of what, as answer to what problem have we reached for a
solution-concept, which indeed has preoccupied us, or at
least some of us, over the last 2,500 years?
It is impossible to legislate in these matters, given the
currency of the term and the contending confusion, or
confusing contention, about what it means. One can only
propose and commend. My proposal is this: at the core of the
rule of law, understood as a distinctive concept, is and has
long and often been a particular concern—namely, the ways
power is exercised; and it responds to a specific antipathy—
namely, the arbitrary exercise of power. Probably the
antipathy is even broader—to the abuse of power—but that
is so capacious a category, so empty of particular content and
difficult to define, that arbitrariness is a large enough species
of the genre (also not at all easy to define)24 to start with. The
proposal is not original (which in this case I take to be a
virtue). I know of no one who thinks arbitrariness has
nothing to do with the rule of law, however not everyone
believes that opposition to it takes us far enough. I’m not
especially ambitious here: I believe in the signal importance
of reducing arbitrariness in the exercise of power, but I too
want more out of life than that. I’m just not sure that it helps
to extend the connotations of the rule of law much further,
lest we bleed the concept dry of any distinctive conceptual
features. In any event, it is enough for me to identify a core
concern. If others offer reasons to supplement it, I will listen
carefully; if they seek to discard it, I will listen, if at all,

24. See, e.g., Samuel Arnold & John R. Harris, What Is Arbitrary Power?, 10
J. POL. POWER 55 passim (2017); Endicott, supra passim note 6; Frank Lovett,
What Counts as Arbitrary Power?, 5 J. POL. POWER 137 passim (2012); Assaf
Sharon, Domination and the Rule of Law, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 128, 131 (David Sobel et. al. eds., 2016).
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skeptically.
Once upon a time, before the World Justice Project got to
spend millions “measuring” the rule of law and before anyone
had even dreamt of linking it with human rights or economic
development, people in many times and many places knew
that there was a phenomenon common in the world, that
could lead to great unpleasantness: arbitrary power, often—
and for centuries in the English common law—called
precisely by that name.25 Not everyone shares the common
law’s stated hostility to arbitrary power—those who wield it
often like it until they lose it—but the occasional masochist
aside, most anyone who has felt it on their skins has thought
it oppressive, and it would be nice if something could be done
about it. Though rarely uncontested, that has been a central
theme—and arbitrary power the central anti-hero—of
countless writings in rule of law traditions over millennia.
It’s a precious theme.
My claim, then, is that a distinctive domain that has long
been closely associated with the ideal of rule of law is the
exercise of power, and that that is a domain worth
recognising in itself. It is not more important than others,
but it has a speciﬁc importance not reducible to other things,
and often not separately considered. There are many ways to
exercise power, and arbitrary ways should be shunned.
Law is speciﬁcally and characteristically—at its core—a
vehicle for the exercise of power; that is what it does. In
certain conﬁgurations and circumstances, or so is the rule of
law hope, it is also a potent means by which power—state
and non-state—might be channeled, directed, constrained,
tempered. One question, perhaps the central one for the rule
of law, is what difference law can make to the ways power is
exercised. Ways of exercising power, including non-arbitrary
and non-dominating ways are, in other words, tied to the
concept of the rule of law, are immanent to the concept. Other
25. See JOHN PHILIP REID, THE RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY
41 (2004).

IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES
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goods, say, economic development or even democracy, that
might be thought to flow from it (and are the only reasons
many people today are interested in it26) are simply not
immanent in this way. The former are not external but
immanent values of the rule of law, their telos. The latter are
external and, in principle, contingent beneﬁts said to ﬂow
from it.
But when is power arbitrary? The word is common
enough, both in ordinary and specialist legal talk, but you
can trawl through the scholarly literature and find little
consensus on what it means.27 A common way with it is to
clear one’s throat by confessing it is “undertheorised” in the
hope that acknowledgement might palliate, at least keep at
bay, conceptual pedants. You can then draw breath and keep
using it in an “I know it when I see it” sort of way. For some
time that is exactly what I did. More recently, I have sought
to extract three kinds of exercise of power that significant
rule of law traditions have treated as both arbitrary, and for
that reason, objectionable.28 These three do not exhaust the
field, but they’re a start and they cover a lot of ground. Here,
I just summarise them. Power is exercised arbitrarily when:
power-wielders are not subject to regular control or limit,
or accountability to anything other than their own will or
pleasure. The common law tradition from the medieval
period to the eighteenth century recurrently warned against
arbitrary power in this sense: no one, not even the King
should have uncontrolled power.
power is exercised in unpredictable—or perhaps more
precisely unreckonable—ways, when those it affects cannot
26. See Martin Krygier, Transformations of the Rule of Law: Legal, Liberal,
Neo-, in THE POLITICS OF LEGALITY IN A NEOLIBERAL AGE 19 passim (Ben Golder
& Daniel McLoughlin eds., 2017).
27. Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where?
And Who Cares?, 50 NOMOS 64, 75–76 (2011).
28. Krygier, supra passim note 9; Martin Krygier, The Rule of Law: Pasts,
Presents, and Two Possible Futures, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 199, 203–04
(2016).
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know, foresee, understand, or comply with the ways power
comes to be wielded. It can strike like lightning. This is the
kind of abuse of power typically taken up in the various lists
of formal characteristics of legality or the rule of law—clear,
prospective, public, etc.—compiled by contemporary analytic
philosophers of law, such as Fuller and Raz, mentioned
above.
when, whether or not limited and/or reckonable, it is
exercised in circumstances which deny or do not afford space
or means for its targets to make themselves heard, to
question, to inform, or to affect the exercise of power over
them, and no requirement that their voices and interests be
taken into account in the exercise of power. They are treated
as if they were, in Jeremy Waldron’s apt phrase, “a rabid
animal or a dilapidated house.”29 The moral basis for
objection to power exercised in such ways, stressed by
Waldron among others, is that persons should always be
treated as persons with interests and a voice that needs to be
heard. It is a large concern, not necessarily limited to law.
Thus, Simone Weil similarly condemned circumstances in
which those with power acted in ways oblivious to the fact
that persons affected by them might be interested actors
with their own perspective on the world.
These three examples of arbitrary power each connect
well-supported candidates for the for the rule of law with
plausible, I think compelling, teleological foundations.
Antidotes to them have been commended in turn by the
common law tradition, formal “laundry listers,” and Jeremy
Waldron’s procedural understanding, as elements of the rule
of law. I am also encouraged to discover from Julian Sempill
that they closely resemble three different conceptions he
finds in John Locke’s uses of the term.30 For reasons I have
29. Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, 50
NOMOS 3, 16 (2011).
30. Julian A. Sempill, Ruler’s Sword, Citizen’s Shield: The Rule of Law & the
Constitution of Power, 31 J.L. & POL., 333, 366 n.89 (2016) (“i. Locke employs
‘arbitrary’ to describe a certain type of discretionary power, namely one that is
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given, I am less attracted to the specific legalistic lists taken
to achieve these ends but I think in each case the point
driving them is sound.
I am not a conceptual analyst, and I am not confident I
can nail with precision the conceptual content that holds
these examples together, but I am much attracted to
Sempill’s account, drawn from what he calls the “limited
government tradition” of rule of law thinking. According to
Sempill:
the tradition maintains that power is legitimate (and, therefore,
properly regarded as authoritative) only if it is wielded in a manner
that gives due weight to, though does not necessarily protect, the
genuinely respect-worthy interests, expectations, and rights of all
relevant persons. Sometimes giving due weight to an interest,
expectation, or right requires it to be treated as inviolable. For
example, a power-holder would only give due weight to the right not
to be tortured by treating the right as inviolable.
If a power-holder failed to give due weight—i.e., respect—to a
genuinely respect-worthy thing, the legitimate scope, if any, of his
or her power would thereby have been exceeded. In the idiom of the
tradition, the power-holder would have acted “arbitrarily” or
“abused” his or her power.31

This formulation appeals to me because it focuses on the
moral qualities of the way power is exercised rather than the
frequently contentious and contended results of that
exercise. And it can be tied in with the civic republican
insistence (see below) that even if power holders choose not
to exercise the power they have in objectionable ways, the
situation is one of arbitrary domination so long as they are
unguided or unconstrained by enforceable impersonal rules, standards, or
criteria . . . ii. Locke also uses ‘arbitrary’ in another sense, to refer to inconstancy
of will: where a ruler possesses a poorly constituted discretionary power—an
‘arbitrary power’ in the first sense—the ruled thereby risk being rendered ‘subject
to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.’ . . . iii. . . .
Locke employs the distinctive limited government conception of arbitrariness
that is the focus of the discussion in the main text: i.e., the exercise of power
without respect for moral equality.”). I draw on Sempill in what follows.
31. Id. at 367–68. For reasons advanced in Parts V and VI below, I prefer to
think of tempering power rather than limiting government, but in most other
respects my views accord closely with Sempill’s.
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in a position to do so. The objection then to unchecked power
and to secret or otherwise unpredictable power (versions 1
and 2 above) is that they allow power-wielders to act
arbitrarily, even if they choose not to. On this version, one
seeks to limit the possibilities that in their exercise of power,
power-wielders can choose not to “give[] due weight to . . . the
genuinely respect-worthy interests, expectations, and rights
of all relevant persons,”32 and also (in the positive version
that I commend below) exercises of power are channelled
through institutions and in ways that encourage, perhaps
require them, to give due weight.
Powerful entities are not home free because they score
well (low) on one but not another dimension of arbitrariness
(as, say, Singapore might on 2 but not on 1 and, at least in
regard to political opponents, not on 3). They should do well
on all three because denial of any is a denial to give “due
weight.” There are all sorts of benefits that might accrue to
a political regime, for example, that applies stable and
understandable rules, but if it is free to act purely by
exercising sovereign will, even if it chooses not to, and even
more if the rules shut those affected out from consideration,
then subjects—more accurately objects33—of power are
vulnerable to its arbitrary exercise. Rule of law comes in
dimensions and degrees, so it’s not one strike and you’re out.
But for any appraisal of the state of the rule of law, how the
exercise of power rates on such dimensions is crucial.
Moreover, the list is not closed and it is unlikely to be short.
Where power discriminates without relevant and justifiable
reason between persons it is acting arbitrarily, and in my
interpretation violates the value of the rule of law. So
selecting candidates on merit for university places is fine; on
race, no.

32. Id.
33. Martin Krygier, The Grammar of Colonial Legality: Subjects, Objects, and
the Australian Rule of Law, in AUSTRALIA RESHAPED 220 passim (Geoffrey
Brennan & Francis G. Castles eds., 2002).
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An arrangement of forces and resources, so that power is
routinely not available for arbitrary exercise, particularly
when the power of some over others is considerable, is not a
simple or natural state of affairs. Unless something is done
to prevent it, arbitrariness is likely where power is
concentrated, as it so often is, in the big grasping hands of
small numbers. Where arbitrariness is available, many
classical authors feared, despotism is not likely to be far
away; indeed a standard contrast classically made and
repeated has been between arbitrary despotism, or tyranny,
on the one hand, and government according to the rule of
law, on the other. These are political terms, and traditionally
the rule of law has been discussed primarily in relation to
political power. But it is a question, to which below and
elsewhere I answer no,34 whether there is any reason in
principle to limit the discussion in that way.
But why is arbitrariness, despotism even, objectionable?
An enlightened despot might ask that; many unenlightened
despots too, too many to mention. Contemporary would-bedespots-on-the-make, such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary or
Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland, are in effect asking precisely
that. Today the conceit is “illiberal democracy,” but aside
from elections, no small thing but not enough, the ambition
is to destroy all tempering constraints on power, such as the
rule of law, and so too to dominate elections themselves.
Kaczyński complains of the “impossibilism” of the state he
now runs and pledges to transform: a “programmed state
incapacity to take many steps necessary for the defence of its
own interests and the good of citizens.”35 The state simply
can’t push through its will. He aims to change that by, among
other things, clearing all intermediate institutions laws, and
practices that might stand in the way. There are several
34. See Krygier, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law’; see also Julian A.
Sempill, What Rendered Ancient Tyrants Detestable: The Rule of Law and the
Constitution of Corporate Power, 10 HAGUE J. RULE L. 219 passim (2018).
35. PiS, Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska: Program Prawa i
Sprawiedliwości 17 (2011).

2019]

RULE OF LAW

767

reasons, or so say many long traditions of thought about the
rule of law, why this is not a great idea.
Perhaps the fundamental one, explored by Sempill and
Waldron, is general and deontological in nature—arbitrary
exercise of power is an immoral way to treat persons. Others
are more particular and empirical/consequential. The
simplest one is that despots, or manipulators of illiberal
democracy cannot be relied upon to be, or even if they start
that way, to stay, enlightened. That’s not a necessary truth,
but it’s a very commonly confirmed empirical one. A more
subtle answer, mentioned above, is given by the civic
republican tradition: whensoever someone has power to treat
you arbitrarily, even if they choose not to, you are in their
power, subject to domination by them, whatever they
arbitrarily choose to do. And that, as slaves of even the most
benign masters have learnt, is a deeply demeaning condition
for a person to be in.36 Add to that, liberal warnings about
arbitrary power being a constant source of fear, a constant
threat to freedom and dignity, and a threat to the sorts of coordination among multitudes that a complex society depends
upon, and you have powerful arguments against it.37
Moreover, a frequently overlooked but no less important
answer than these three, speaks directly to the Polish ruler,
Jarosław Kaczyński’s determination to overcome the state
“impossibilism” that frustrates him so much. It is as much
pragmatic as moral. As his government is beginning to
illustrate, arbitrary power can be a powerful source of
stupidity, even craziness, in the exercise of power. He’s still
far from the apogee of this trajectory yet, but just visit Nay
Pyi Taw, the bizarre, secretly-built, largely empty,
Disneyland capital of Myanmar. Or walk the huge main
boulevard of Bucharest to the grotesque but enormous
Presidential palace built for and once occupied by the tight-

36. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 52–57 (David Miller & Alan Ryan eds.,
1997).
37. For further discussion see Krygier, supra note 27, at 79–81.

768

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

knit rulers of “socialism in one family,” built by “the genius
of Bucharest,” the “source of our light,” “the treasure of
wisdom and charisma.” Streets, roads, and houses were
razed and some 40,000 residents were ejected from their
homes with 24 hours notice and minimal compensation, for
this absurdity.38 Alas, it is not at all hard to find evidence of
what arbitrary power, which never has to answer a question
or conform to an institutional requirement, can conjure up.
And I have not even mentioned Mao Tse Tung or even one
Kim, the earlier of whom indeed were models for the genius
of Bucharest.
As Confucius might have said, governments that act in
the dark too often lose their way. They do the wrong things,
catch and harass the wrong people, miss the right ones.
Often they blunder, and if ill motivated they do worse than
blunder, all the more because they can do their worst in the
dark.
V. WHAT’S THE SOLUTION?39
Arbitrariness, then, is a specific and obnoxious vice when
added to power. There are many other vices which depend on
the particular substantive purposes and results of the
exercise, but arbitrary power is vicious enough even if
exercised with the best of intentions, and even if some of its
results prove to be salutary. It is a free-standing and toxic
vice, that has to do with the ways power is exercised. Appeal
to the rule of law signals the hope that there may be ways,
and that law might contribute, to diminish the kinds and
levels of arbitrariness available to those who exercise power.
What might we expect the character of such measures to be?
The commonest way to frame the hoped-for contribution
38. Darrick Danta, Ceausescu’s Bucharest, 83 AM. GEOGRAPHICAL SOC’Y N.Y.
170, 175 (1993).
39. Parts of this and the next section are drawn and adapted from my
previous work. See Martin Krygier, Tempering Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
THE RULE OF LAW 34 passim (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017).

2019]

RULE OF LAW

769

of the rule of law to reducing arbitrariness is to understand
it in a negative, defensive manner, to characterise it as good
less for what it enables and creates, than for what it might
prevent; to identify its purpose with what it rules out rather
than what it rules in; what it manages to prevent, curb,
restrain, rather than what it might generate and encourage
to flourish.
The reasoning is familiar. The world’s a tough place
where “the strong do what they can while the weak do what
they must.”40 The signal contribution of constraints on power
is to try to help the weak by putting limits on what the strong
can do. On this interpretation, the point is to block and limit
the possibility of unruly power, to curb and restrain power’s
exercise. This is not a new view, and it remains popular
among liberals, even more among neo-liberals. Thus
Friedrich Hayek asserts that “power itself has always
appeared the archevil,”41 and insists elsewhere: “The
effective limitation of power is the most important problem
of social order.”42 It is the job of constitutionalism and the
rule of law to impose the limits: “Constitutionalism means
limited government. . . . indeed, what function is served by a
constitution which makes omnipotent government possible?
Is its function to be merely that governments work smoothly
and efficient, whatever their aims?”43
And it’s not just ‘neos’ who think this way. Thus Judith
Shklar, a profound analyst and exponent of liberalism, reads
Montesquieu to argue that the rule of law:
really has only one aim, to protect the ruled against the aggression
of those who rule. While it embraces all people, it fulfills only one
fundamental aim, freedom from fear, which, to be sure, was for
Montesquieu supremely important. . . . This whole scheme is
ultimately based on a very basic dichotomy. The ultimate spiritual
and political struggle is always between war and law. . . . The
40. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, bk. 5, para. 89.
41. F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, 159 (50th anniversary ed. 1994).
42. 3 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 128 (1979).
43. 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 1 (1973).
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institutions of judicial citizen protection may create rights, but they
exist in order to avoid what Montesquieu took to be the greatest of
human evils, constant fear created by the threats of violence and
the actual cruelties of the holders of military power in society. 44

Shklar’s own choice between these two accounts is clear:
If one then begins with the fear of violence, the insecurity of
arbitrary government, and the discriminations of injustice, one may
work one’s way up to finding a significant place for the Rule of Law,
and for the boundaries it has historically set upon these the most
enduring of our political troubles.45

On this view the prevention of evil, rather than a quest for
the good, is the signal virtue of the rule of law; its goal,
supremely important but negative, is “damage control.”46
For such thinkers, and there are plenty of them (me
among them), this negative, constraining, controlling aspect
of the rule of law is fundamental. And indeed it responds to
“the circumstances of politics”47 as they often have been
found to be. The exercise of power carries terrible risks. It is
wise to be aware and wary of them and to think about what
may be done to minimise them, both because they are
directly threatening in themselves and because where such
threats are realised, nothing much else good will occur.
Partisans of the rule of law are clearly deeply informed by
such thought, which is a form of “moral realism” in the sense
identified by Philip Selznick, according to which it is:
[not] enough to think of specific evils as problems to be solved or as
obstacles to be overcome. Rather, the perspective of moral realism
treats some transgressions as dynamic and inescapable. They can
be depended on to arise, in one form or another, despite our best
efforts to put them down.48

44. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT
(Stanley Hoffman ed., 1998).
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45. Id. at 36.
46. Id. at 9.
47. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT passim (1999).
48. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH 175 (1992).
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And not just “moral realism” but specifically political
realism is necessary in the case of constitutionalism and the
rule of law, for thinking about such things is not, as both
Bernard Williams and Jeremy Waldron have emphasised
against much conventional academic unwisdom, “just
applied moral philosophy.”49 Politics and the wielding of
power more generally are, after all, not just a matter of the
ideal ends we should seek, but of conflict, violence,
oppression, domination, their consequences, and what might
be needed and feasible to avoid them.50 The liberalism of fear
articulated by Shklar and others is a sober, somber, response
to such realities.
For a long time my view of the rationale and justification
of the rule of law stopped about here. Central to the greatest
man-made tragedies of the twentieth century seemed to me
overweening, ideology-driven and otherwise unconstrained
despotisms. From that I took a central lesson to be that
power needed above all to be reliably and securely limited,
curbed. And when I came to the rule of law, I took its promise
to be, above all, that it might provide such limitation.
I still think there is much to be said for the virtues of
institutionalised constraint that the rule of law promises.
However, a purely negative, defensive, interpretation of the
liberalism of fear can also reduce and distort one’s
understanding of politics, of power, and of the rule of law.
Violence and oppression are not the sum of what politics and
power well exercised can and often do deliver, and limitation
of power is not the sum of what the rule of law can contribute
to a well-ordered public order.
I was shaken into this new (to me) understanding by an
article of my friend Stephen Holmes, by whom I have often
been surprised. He has frequently argued that modern

49. Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: An Inaugural Lecture, 21 J.
POL. PHIL. 1, 6 (2013).
50. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED: REALISM
MORALISM IN POLITICAL ARGUMENT 52–61 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 2005).
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liberals, unlike some of their classical forebears, have simply
not understood how liberal values depend on state strength
and are endangered by state weakness. Holmes has pursued
these themes in many contexts, from the history of liberal
thought to the arguments of many governments post-9/11
that in such situations of emergency they needed to be able
to “throw off the shackles” of the rule of law. One context was
particularly close to my heart and turned my head. It was
drawn from the pervasive and pathological weaknesses of
the Yeltsin post-Soviet Russian state. It had been so obvious
to rule of law liberals like me that the Soviet state’s
elephantine power was a major source of misery for its
citizens that when I read Holmes’s article, What Russia
Teaches Us Now,51 I was caught unprepared by his argument
that post-communist Russian experience taught that
whereas:
During the Cold War, when all political evils seemed to swarm from
“too much government,” the threat posed by too weak a government
played little role in liberal self-understanding. . . . Today’s Russia
makes excruciatingly plain that liberal values are threatened just
as thoroughly by state incapacity as by despotic power.52

In that piece and many others, Holmes makes plain how
much modern societies depend upon well-functioning states,
able to do many things that require marshalled strength and
resources that can be routinely collected in non-coercive but
not routinely evaded ways. Once the point is made, and
examples of the pathologies of the insufficiently strong public
institutions paraded, I don’t know any way round it. So I
have adopted it, and believe that any adequate
understanding of the rule of law must accommodate it.
For power has an undeservedly bad name, which is a
pity, since it’s not going anywhere and if it were to, we would
miss it. We need power, and not just as a necessary evil but
51. Stephen Holmes, What Russia Teaches Us Now, AM. PROSPECT (July-Aug.
1997), https://prospect.org/article/what-russia-teaches-us-now.
52. Id.
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a positive good. We could not do, and certainly we could not
do well, without it in many forms and for many purposes. We
should not want to deny the need or emasculate the capacity
for power to keep peace, defend populations, enforce legal
judgments, collect taxes, balance other powers, and so on.
And we don’t want ordinary citizens to be impotent either.
People who have ever seen, still worse lived in, what are
called “failed states,” have witnessed or suffered a terrible
experience, not because the state is too strong but because it
is too weak to do what we need states to do. Other states,
conversely, might be too strong or strong in the wrong ways,
and these are also problems to which the rule of law is
relevant. In any event, we’re stuck with power; it won’t
disappear. As my colleague, Theunis Roux has remarked,
one of the reasons we need effective public power,
democratically sourced, is to protect us against private
power. Conversely, as the history of communism so
dramatically demonstrated, a central reason for the
devastation that communist regimes wrought on their
citizenry was that they had begun with the elimination of
independent sources of resource and power that might stand
in their way.
Holmes had long stressed the empowering consequences
of constitutionalism and the rule of law; what, in contrast to
the more common negative conception, he calls “positive
constitutionalism.”53 Appropriately configured laws, on this
view, provide “enabling constraints.”54 For the “paradoxical
insight” here, as Holmes describes it, is that:
Limited government is, or can be, more powerful than unlimited
government. . . . [T]hat constraints can be enabling, which is far

53. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 178 (1995).
54. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS passim (2000); MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA
OF PUBLIC LAW passim (2003); DAVID STARK & LASZLO BRUSZT, POSTSOCIALIST
PATHWAYS: TRANSFORMING POLITICS AND PROPERTY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 166–
87 (1998).
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from being a contradiction, lies at the heart of liberal
constitutionalism. . . . By restricting the arbitrary powers of
government officials, a liberal constitution can, under the right
conditions, increase the state’s capacity to focus on specific problems
and mobilise collective resources for common purposes.55

Jeremy Waldron has similarly criticised the tendency among
constitutionalists to
think simplistically [of constitutional devices] . . . just as brakes
upon the law-making process, ways of slowing things down, points
of possible resistance against oppressive legislation. Equally there
is a tendency to think of the formal separation of powers between
(say) legislature, executive, and judiciary simply as a way of
diluting power and making it harder for it to be exercised.56

He has insisted on the positive role and potential of
constitutional provisions. Constitutions, after all, constitute
the elements of a polity and empower particular institutions.
They distribute power to some institutions and actors and
not others, they establish fora for discussion and decision, “so
that public deliberation becomes a structured enterprise.”57
All this crucial work is given short shrift by a perspective in
which “[e]verything is seen through the lens of restraint and
limitation.”58
There is no contradiction here, I now understand.
Overweening, despotic power is horrible, but so is the lack of
power of the sort that is needed, where it is needed. Power is
necessary, but not just any form or way of exercising power
will do. If Yeltsin illustrated the first point, Putin illustrates
the second. Power must be of the right sort in the right places
to be able to do what cannot be done without it. If it is of the
wrong sort, but also if it is not powerful enough, we are in
trouble. The issue, then is not to get rid of power but to

55. HOLMES, supra note 53, at xi.
56. Jeremy Waldron, Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View 22 (N.Y. Univ. Pub.
Law Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-87, 2012).
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 22.

2019]

RULE OF LAW

775

reduce possibilities of its malignant exercise.
These are not new discoveries. Thus Holmes traces the
awareness of enabling constraints to Bodin in the sixteenth
century. Montesquieu was well aware of them too. The whole
of The Spirit of the Laws was bent to investigating the
sources of moderation of government and recommending
institutional ways to ensure it. He notes that, despite the
horrors of despotism and the attractions of moderation, the
world has seen many more despotic governments than wellordered moderate ones. He laments that but finds it
unsurprising, because a moderate government is a much
more complicated achievement.
Despite men’s love of liberty, despite their hatred of violence, most
peoples are subjected to this type of government [despotism]. This
is easy to understand. In order to form a moderate government, it
is necessary to combine the several powers; to regulate, temper, and
set them in motion; to give, as it were, ballast to one, in order to
enable it to counterpoise the other. This is a masterpiece of
legislation; rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by
prudence. By contrast, a despotic government leaps to view, so to
speak; it is uniform throughout; as only passions are needed to
establish it, everyone is good enough for that.59

The language with which he makes the contrast is
suggestive, for it is not a language of brute impediments60
but of difficult and complex balancing, tempering,
regulating; not shackling, and certainly not weakening.
But what sort of strength will do? Here a distinction from
the historical sociologist, Michael Mann, is helpful. Mann
59. C. L. DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 63 (Anne M.
Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1992) (1748); cf.
AURELIAN CRAIUTU, A VIRTUE FOR COURAGEOUS MINDS: MODERATION IN FRENCH
POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1748–1830 31–32 (2012) (“[T]he strong connection between
moderation and institutional complexity [is] an idea that would resonate . . . with
Montesquieu, Mounier, Necker, Mme de Staël, and Constant. . . . [C]lassical
authors praised the institutional framework of mixed government, not only
because the latter blended various social interests and elements, allowing them
to coexist harmoniously, but also because it made it extremely difficult for any
group to impose its will over others and exercise arbitrary power.”).
60. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 59, at 63.
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distinguishes between what he calls despotic power—”the
range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake
without routine, institutionalised negotiations with civil
society”—and infrastructural power—”the capacity of the
state to actually penetrate society, and to implement
logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”61 For
the release and development of social and economic energies,
as well as for political decency, it is infrastructural power
that is crucial. Despotic states combine arbitrariness and
lack of political or legal limits with chronic incapacity to
mobilise social energies and make use of social potential. As
a former colleague of Mann’s, John Hall, puts it,62 they sit
like capstones atop the societies they dominate; they do not
penetrate organically and effectively into the social
structure. They dominate from above, but do little to
contribute from within.
The connection between despotic strength and social
weakness is not accidental. Though despots can repress
effectively for a time, and mobilise for limited specialised
purposes such as war, they have proved very weak in the
capacity to penetrate, mobilise, and facilitate energetic and
resilient social forces. On the contrary, they typically seek to
block them, and they stunt their development. In other
terms, despotically strong states go along with weak
societies. And this is centrally because of the arbitrariness
and unpredictability with which they exercise power. These
states are predatory and their societies are prey. They are
not productive, and neither are their societies. That is yet
another reason why the attempts by populist leaders such as
Kaczyński and Orbán to destroy institutional constraints on
their power are so dangerous: they feed exactly the sort of

61. MICHAEL MANN, STATES, WAR, AND CAPITALISM 5 (Basil Blackwell ed.
1988); see also 1 MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER 477 (1986)
(contrasting “power over civil society, that is, despotism” and “the power to
coordinate civil society, that is, infrastructural strength”).
62. JOHN A. HALL, POWERS AND LIBERTIES: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
34–35 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1985).
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state power that threatens a strong society, by starving it of
the sort of moderated infrastructural power it needs.
Some evidence of the usefulness of this distinction was
provided by the house-of-cards collapse of the Soviet Union
and its dominions. This was one of the most despotic empires
the world has known, but it was not the first occasion when
apparently overwhelmingly powerful despotisms have wilted
before forces which hardly seemed up to the task. Like the
collapse of communism, the French and Russian
Revolutions, the end of the Marcos regime, the fall of the
Shah, all seemed overdetermined after the event. But they
revealed that extraordinary fragility of despotisms which
keeps taking us by surprise. It shouldn’t.63 Despotically
powerful states can be remarkable brittle.
By contrast, though the contemporary difficulties of
liberal democracy might lead to a change in the durability of
this assessment (but they might not; the jury is still out),
there is a lot to be said for the strength of the tempered
powers of liberal democracies. At least during the course of
the twentieth century, muddling moderate liberal regimes—
derided and disdained for much of the time—displayed, in
their prosaic apparently shambolic and ineffectual way, a
staying power that many—often in that century and on very
plausible evidence—had doubted. This may be partly due to
the fact that constitutionalism and the rule of law not only
get in the way of despotic power, but they also channel,
direct, facilitate, and inform infrastructural strength.
Perhaps the day of specific institutions that have done such
work is passing, and new kinds will need to arise, but I
cannot conceive of an end of the need for that sort of work to
be done somehow.
Moreover, the state is not the only game in town, neither
as a source of problems nor as a source of responses to them.

63. The last few paragraphs are drawn from my Australian Broadcasting
Commission radio lectures (the Boyer lectures), Martin Krygier, BETWEEN FEAR
AND HOPE: HYBRID THOUGHTS ON PUBLIC VALUES 112–13 (1997).
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The ideal of the rule of law will involve much more than the
law itself to be able to respond strongly and effectively to
arbitrary exercises of power, wherever they come from. One
of the deepest pathologies of despotic power, found at the
extreme in totalitarian states, is the determined subversion
of non-state as well as state-infrastructural strength.
Another, found in many post-communist despotisms, occurs
when it aids and abets the power of non-state “oligarchs,”
“tycoons,” and similar.
VI. TEMPERING POWER
How might one capture this seeming paradox of
constraints that enable, limits that empower, mixes and
balances that do not emasculate but render more potent. A
moment’s thought about ordinary life experience will show
that there is no real paradox here. Anyone who has learnt to
swim will have quickly discovered that effective performance
requires mastery of, and in a sense coming to be mastered
by, constraints, techniques and disciplines to marshal and
channel raw energy to good and effective purpose. No one
imagines that the power of a swimmer (or boxer) is lessened
by the disciplined constraints within which they ply their
craft. So too the ability of institutions to concentrate their
powers where and how they should is enhanced by traditions,
practices, requirements, procedures and institutions of the
rule of law which, among other things, redirect their
movements so they don’t splash or smash around where and
how they shouldn’t.
Seeking language to express this, as it turns out
unparadoxical, paradox of moderation that strengthens, the
term “tempering power” came to mind. I was excited and for
a moment hubristically self-satisfied to come up with this
“coinage” for this purpose, though somewhat less so when I
discovered the ancient Greek, Roman, and early common law
forebears and origins, of the term and the idea. Were I a
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philologist like Nietzsche64 or a scholar of ancient Greece and
Rome like Helen North,65 I could enrich my use of this
metaphor in many ways unavailable to me, homme moyen
sensuel that I am. But the English term is suggestive enough
on its own, and with even a little unscholarly ransacking it
captures a great deal that we want in relation to the exercise
of power. So I have stuck with tempering power, and I keep
finding reasons to applaud my ignorant plagiarism.
There are at least three registers in which we speak in
English of “tempering” or “temperance.” The first is as a
dimension of personal virtue, the second of institutional
behaviour, and the third as a chemical process. Together, all
of them are grist to the rule of law’s mill. For the Greeks, the
term sophrosyne, which Cicero translated into Latin and
introduced into European tradition as temperantia,66 was
one of the four cardinal virtues. It included restraint,
particularly self-restraint, and was the opposite of hubris,
but it also suggested and went along with moderation and
self-knowledge. The example of self-knowledge is important.
As Helen North comments on Greek literary traditions:
From Aeschylus and Sophocles, Herodotus and the grave-epigrams,
we learn that to the Athenian of the late to mid-fifth century
sôphrosynê implied good sense moderation, self-knowledge and that
accurate observance of divine and human boundaries which

64. 3 PAUL VAN TONGEREN, NIETZCHE’S REVALUATION OF
VIRTUES: THE CASE OF SOPHROSYNE 128 (Nijmegan Univ. 2001).
65. See HELEN NORTH, SOPHROSYNE: SELF-KNOWLEDGE
vii (1966).
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66. Actually,
Cicero suggests [four] different translations of sophrosyne, that all have
their own connotations: moderatio which means moderation in the sense
of control and restrain; constantia, which means being (remaining)
unperturbable or undisturbed; frugalitas, which means frugality and
thrift; and the fourth one, which became the most influential:
temperantia, which means of course temperance. But temperance has in
Latin, certainly in Cicero’s Latin the connotation of: “the right mixture”,
the right balance; temperare means to mix different liquids in the right
proportion.
VAN TONGEREN,

supra note 64 at 133.
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protects man from dangerous extremes of every kind. In private life
it is opposed to hybris, and in the life of the State to both anarchy
and tyranny.67

Many aspects of the rule of law are intended to encourage
such virtues of moderation and thoughtful self-knowledge.68
Institutionally, tempering suggests a moderating
blending of powers and of elements (e.g. power with law;
justice with mercy; strength with moderation), a balancing,
designed to lessen the severity, the harshness of unblended
motive or power. Thus Henry Bracton, the first compiler of
the English common law in the thirteenth century, was not
out to weaken the king, who “has no equal within his realm,”
when he urged that he should “temper his power by law,
which is the bridle of power.”69 Again:
The king has a superior, namely, God. Also the law by which he is
made king. Also his curia, namely, the earls and barons, because if
he is without bridle, that is without law, they ought to put the bridle
on him. [That is why the earls are called the partners, so to speak,
of the king; he who has a partner has a master.] When even they,
like the king, are without bridle, then will the subjects cry out and
say “Lord Jesus, bind fast their jaws in rein and bridle.” 70

In early medieval representations, Temperantia held a
mixing bowl, “in keeping with the translation of
‘temperamentum’ as measure/proper mixture/moderation.”71
But in Lorenzetti’s marvellous Allegory of Good Government,
in Siena’s town hall, Temperantia holds an hourglass rather
than a mixing bowl, I imagine to make an allied point.

67. Helen North, A Period of Opposition to Sôphrosynê in Greek Thought, in
78 TRANSACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
3 (1947).
68. See generally Waldron, supra note 56; Waldron, supra note 8.
69. Henry Bracton, Bracton on Kingship, in THE AGE OF PROPERTY: THE
AFTERMATH OF HENRY II (S. Thorne, trans. 1968), http://www.law.harvard.edu
/faculty/cdonahue/courses/lhsemelh/materials/Mats5F.pdf.
70. Id.
71. GERHARD DOHRN-VAN ROSSUM, HISTORY OF THE HOUR: CLOCKS
MODERN TEMPORAL ORDERS 5–6 (Thomas Dunlap trans. 1996).
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Among the fresco’s seven “virtues of good government,” she
is immediately flanked by Justitia on one side holding the
severed head of some (presumably justly convicted) felon and
Magnanimita freely disbursing coins from a large dish, on
the other. The juxtaposition is unlikely to be accidental.
Justice and magnanimity are good, but temperance mediates
between them with measured patience, which allows for
thoughtfulness. A good society needs all three virtues, plus
another four. This complexity is missed in much of the
conventional language of constitutionalism and the rule of
law.
Indeed, though negative constraining conceptions of
constitutionalism often speak of separation of powers, as
everyone knows that is not enough: mixing is key. As Craiutu
observes: “Montesquieu in fact favoured a blending rather
than a strict separation of powers and referred in his book to
pouvoirs distribués and not pouvoirs séparés.”72 Such
distribution of powers does not lessen the capacity for
effective exercise of power. On the contrary, it is arguably a
prerequisite for it. This is the burden of Holmes’s wise
reflections on the temptations governments have felt to
“remove the shackles” in times of emergency:
The rule of law enforces an uncomfortable degree of transparency
on the executive. It requires that the factual premises for the
government’s resort to coercion and force must be tested in some
sort of adversarial process, giving interested and knowledgeable
parties a fair opportunity to question the accuracy and reliability of
evidence. That is how due process serves the public interest and
helps reduce the risk of error. To reject the rule of law is reckless
because it frees the government from the need to give reasons for
its actions before a tribunal that does not depend on spoon-fed
disinformation and is capable of pushing back. A government that
is not compelled to give reasons for its actions may soon have no
plausible reasons for its actions. 73

Analogous points can be made about the third sense in
72. CRAIUTU, supra note 59, at 49.
73. STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR’S CAPE: AMERICA’S RECKLESS RESPONSE
6 (2007).
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which we use the term, for the chemical process of tempering
steel (and other compounds) to make it/them more fit for
purpose. Certainly, tempering does not suggest weakening
but on the contrary, toughening; the resulting compound is
less brittle than its primary component alone. Tempered
steel, after all is stronger than iron or untempered steel; as
Wikipedia informs us, it is intended “to achieve
greater toughness by decreasing the hardness of the alloy.”74
And it does so by judicious blending. As that distinguished
metallurgist,75 John Braithwaite, has instructed us:
“Tempered steel is more flexible, yet stronger for realising its
purposes: it is resilient and responsive. Tempered steel is
distinguished from iron by a combination of alloying it with
carbon and other checks and balances and testing it with
extreme heat that makes it resilient.”76
And so, the umbrella term that I have come to prefer for
the contributions of the rule of law is tempering power,
rather than limiting, or any of the other words—taming,
restraining, controlling, etc.—commonly invoked.77 Not that
they are simply wrong, but they are insufficient to grasp
some core features of the rule of law. For the rule of law is
not merely about constraint, it also depends upon, and in
turn is intended to produce, salutary positive results, in
many circumstances difficult to achieve otherwise. Many
aspects of the rule of law are intended to generate virtues of
moderation and thoughtful self-knowledge, that are
encouraged by constitutional and rule of law practices and
institutions, not contained or constrained by them. Such
practices and institutions provide “enabling constraints”
that enable more focused and effective use of power for good
74. Tempering (metallurgy), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Tempering_(metallurgy) (last visited May 6, 2019).
75. It’s possible. He knows about everything else. See also his elaboration of
these qualities in his contribution to this volume, John Braithwaite, Tempered
Power, Variegated Capitalism, Law and Society, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 527 (2019).
76. John Braithwaite, Hybrid Politics for Justice, supra note 17, at 25.
77. Krygier, supra note 39, at 35.
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ends (while making more difficult some uses of power for bad
ends).
Applied to the ideal of the rule of law, then, tempering
can suggest some judicious combination of mix, balance,
moderation, self-knowledge, all contributing to particular
and salutary sorts of strength. These suggestions need to be
kept in mind, for the negative conception, the flint-edged
realism of Shklar or other sceptics, though the one that more
immediately springs to mind, is not the only way of viewing
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and not on its own the
best.
VII. TEMPERING POWER AS A SOCIAL IDEAL
Not many people will deny that ideals of the rule of law
are hostile to arbitrary power. Nor is it likely that many, at
least of those attracted to the rule of law, would object to the
notion of “tempering power,” even if that is not a term that
today springs immediately to mind. So what is gained by
bashing out these old tunes with all this heavy metal? What
difference does it make to disinter these terms and to insist
that they should come first, should frame our thinking about
the rule of law rather than, as is more usual, the other way
around? I have sought to suggest one reason in the preceding
section, but taking that seriously suggests another. Here it
is important to follow not just the meaning but some broad
implications of this way of speaking.
As so often, a clue comes from John Braithwaite. Some
years ago, I received an (unintended but powerful)
provocation from him. Having spent all those years grinding
away at the rule of law, I was startled, at a conference I had
organised in 2011 on media, democracy, and the rule of law,
by the argument of a paper John delivered, with the
apparently innocent title Is Separating Powers a Rule of Law
Issue? The Media Case. John pointed out that though many
people speak of the rule of law as a “good thing for its own
sake,” it was not that. Rather, he contended, it “is best
thought of as part of a separation of powers rather than the
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reverse.” Why should the order matter? According to
Braithwaite:
Conceiving the separation of powers as a rule of law question
constrains a republican imagination in how to struggle for more
variegated separations of powers. It tracks political thought to a
barren, static constitutional jurisprudence of a tripartite separation
of powers. This when conditions of modernity require us to see
private concentrations of power such as ratings agencies and
private armies . . . as both dangers and contributors to productive
balances of power.78

I am sympathetic to John’s “republican imagination,” but
even if I were not I would find the point he makes here
arresting, though I would quibble with the statement of the
goal as “separation of powers,” for reasons already
elaborated, and which I believe John would accept. Following
Montesquieu, I prefer “distribution” to “separation,” and in
turn “tempering” as the underlying reason for both.
Distribution of powers is a strong way to temper power, not
to be valued in itself but for what, in certain forms and for
certain purposes, it can prevent and support. That is true
also of separation, but separation is not enough. Distribution
involves separation, but it also must involve connection, cooperation and mutual oversight, judicious mixing and
balancing, lest sources of salutary power (e.g. for
peacekeeping, enforcement of bargains, etc.) be disjointed
and weakened, or lest it lead to sources of dysfunctional selfserving autarky by corporate groups, say among formerly
subordinate and newly rendered independent judges in postdespotic states that, liberated from despotic control, become
free to serve no other interests than their own.79 l don’t
believe that Braithwaite would disagree with any of this,
indeed it is not hard to find passages in which he makes the

78. John Braithwaite, Australian National University, Is Separating Powers
a Rule of Law Issue? The Media Case 2–3 (2011) (transcript on file with author).
79. See Stephen Holmes, Judicial Independence as Ambiguous Reality and
Insidious Illusion, in FROM LIBERAL VALUES TO DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF JÁNOS KIS 3, 9 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2004).
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same points, but I fear that putting “separation” front and
centre might mislead.
The deeper point remains. It has effectively been the
argument of this paper that we would gain greatly by
following John’s suggestion that the law be viewed, not as
the always-necessary centre-piece of power-tempering
policy, to which other measures are at best secondary or
supplementary addenda but as one implement among
several, of potentially unique importance in some respects
and circumstances, but dependent for its success on many
other things, and perhaps not more important for the
achievement of its own goal than they. As John has recently
made the point:
For the complex conditions of contemporary capitalism, the simple
liberal prescription of writing laws and enforcing them equally and
consistently is an empty vessel. . . . Domination reduction requires
a plurality of institutions that temper abuse of power: anticorruption commissions; independent election commissions;
human-rights commissions; ombudsmen; public auditors-general
interacting productively with private-sector auditors; private and
public ratings agencies; private regulation by stock exchanges;
public regulation of stock exchanges and securities; anti-fraud
policing; competition authorities that hold monopolisation to
account; prudential regulators; and more. More importantly than
all of these elements, it requires a vigilant civil society . . . .80

To conclude, there are two fundamental differences
between the account presented here and most conventional
accounts. First, the ideal is not best thought of in terms of
limitation but of tempering. That ideal is important because
untempered power is so often so obnoxious. And if it is, if
arbitrary power presents such dangers, we should be wary of
it wherever it is likely to be significant.
And that leads to a second overarching observation:
tempering power, the ideal of the rule of law, is not best
thought of as a self-contained ideal for law or for government.
It is also, and in my view primarily and more significantly an

80. John Braithwaite, Hybrid Politics for Justice, supra note 17, at 22.
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ideal for polity and society, to be understood in relation to,
and as an element in solution of, perennial problems that
arise from pathologies of the exercise of power, wherever and
in whatever hands it is powerful enough to harm.
For if arbitrary power is as obnoxious and tempering
power as important as I have suggested, it is not obvious why
we should focus so single-mindedly on state arbitrariness or
legal tempering. On the one hand, both in the preWestphalian world and the globalised, corporatised world of
today, there have been many, and are likely to be more,
centres of great power liable to arbitrary and consequential
abuse, apart from the state. Perhaps Michael Walzer
exaggerates a little in saying that “plutocrats and
meritocrats . . . are tyrants as much as autocrats are”81 but
why assume that their tyrannous potential is of no account?
What of al Qaida, the Mafia, banks, huge corporations,
omnivorous data miners such as Facebook or Google? The list
of power-amassers and wielders with a potential for
arbitrary exercise of power at great social cost is unlikely to
be short or stay still. All over the world, capital has huge
power and consequences, and often they are not tempered;
indeed they typically resist tempering, and with powerful
resources. The struggle to temper power must extend to
these sorts of power as well, and often traditional legal
measures are weak, sometimes spectacularly weak in
dealing with them. We should not forget every other source
of challenge just because one has traditionally loomed so
large.
Again, when communism became post, rule of law
promotion became a central game. But not every postcommunist problem is a problem of states, which indeed are
often overly weak, at least in crucial domains, particularly
infrastructural domains, rather than dangerously strong.
With the collapse of the Party’s monopoly of power, rule of
81. MICHAEL WALZER, THICK
ABROAD 37 (1994).
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law and the tempering of power have not been automatic
results. For there are other potential external sources of
threat. This is a point that populists in post-communist
states exploit mercilessly, but they do so partly because there
are pathologies there to exploit. Thus, powerful economic
actors or networks of political and politico-economic actors
and relationships: “oligarchs” (Russia), “tycoons” (Croatia),
“wrestlers” (Bulgaria), “biznesmeni” and “banksterzy”
(Poland), Mafias (everywhere), have in various ways and
with varying degrees of success, sought to “capture,” to lean
on, or to bypass the state. Personal clientelistic networks
which are commonly embedded in social power
arrangements, are often politically significant, and
sometimes legally so. When applied to the legal system, they
exert pressure to override formal constraints with informal
and anti-formal considerations: to make exemptions, to stall
or discontinue cases, to minimise penalties, to make
favorable decisions. And a lot of what they do—employ, deny
employment, speculate, corrupt, subvert—does not involve
the state at all, but does involve the arbitrary exercise of
power. This is the land of networks. There are many, and
their (net-)workings are often secret. These are points that
are hugely and irresponsibly exaggerated by modern
populists like those of PiS in Poland or Fidesz in Hungary
(who in turn do little to destroy such forces; they just replace
them with their own networks), but there is a reason they
have resonance. Simply to ignore them is to play into the
hands of those who would wish to exaggerate their
significance.
Surely wherever power is significant enough to bring
with it the sorts of harms I have mentioned, it should raise
the sorts of worries rule of law partisans have had. If
arbitrary power is as obnoxious as many have thought it to
be, it is likely to be so wherever someone or group or
institution has enough of it to throw around with damaging
effect. Philip Selznick wrote a marvelous book, Law, Society,
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and Industrial Justice,82 on how one might think of bringing
the values of the rule of law to the relationships between
large organisations and their members. It was a great book,
but a lonely one.
The test should be the kind and amount of power an
entity has and the likely consequences of its arbitrary
exercise of that power, not its location. And so, people who
rightly identify arbitrary power as a problem in need of a
solution need to cast their nets more widely. Sometimes
states will be key targets, sometimes they will not, and
whether they will or will not is a contingent matter. It
depends.
Conversely, whatever the sources of arbitrary power,
why assume that central legal institutions, rules and
procedures are uniformly likely to be at the centre of solving
whatever problem one has postulated for ideal of the rule of
law (unless you have already settled that issue by
definition)? And why imagine that the means to achievement
are always and everywhere likely to be any particular
selection or other, of legal institutions, practices or rules?
These means are elusive, are likely to vary, and have to be
found.
When we look to find them, conventional lawyers’ and
jurisprudes’ talk and imaginations will often not lead us in
the right direction or take us far enough. Many of the threats
to rule of law values come from beyond the state, many
remedies to such threats will also need to be found outside
the state and its laws, and even where the state and law are
relevant, their significance depends on social agencies and
currents that they do not control.
Untempered power might flourish outside the state in
ways the law has difficulty, or sometimes no interest in,
reaching. So conventional lawyers’ and jurisprudes’ talk,
sensibilities, and imaginations will often not lead us in the
82. See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY,
(1969).
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right direction or take us far enough. Taking the ideal of the
rule of law seriously requires recognition that many of its
most significant potential sources of support are often likely
to be found, indeed will need to be found, in institutions,
practices and traditions in the wider society, not merely in or
even near the obvious institutional centers of official law. So,
the salience of features of legal institutions, formal and
procedural characteristics or whatever, nominated to
constitute the rule of law and recommended to countries in
need of it, depends on how successfully they can support the
attainment of this value. That has to be the test.
The challenge for anyone seeking to temper power
anywhere is not primarily to emulate or parody practices
that might have worked somewhere else, but to find ways of
reducing the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power,
whatever that takes, what-or-whoever has it, wherever one
happens to be. What roles law might play in helping achieve
that solution, and how best those roles might be played, are
questions with contingent and variable answers, likely to be
given differently in different circumstances. Put together,
this ideal expresses an aspiration for a complex social,
political and legal achievement—the tempering of the
exercise of power so that possibilities of arbitrariness are
reduced. Acts of state and the forms of law are likely to
contribute, in varying degrees, but never on their own.
I am taken with a phrase coined for another purpose by
Gianfranco Poggi. He characterises Durkheim’s concept of
society—what distinguishes it from a mere mass of people—
as a contingent, “insofar as reality,” “real insofar as certain
things go on”83: in that case, socially patterned behaviours,
shared and internalised norms, and so on. I think of the ideal
and point of the rule of law that way. It is a relative and
variable achievement, not all or nothing. But one can say it
exists in good shape or repair insofar as a certain sort of
valued state of affairs, to which law contributes in particular
83. GIANFRANCO POGGI, DURKHEIM 85 (2000).
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and variable ways, exists. On the conception advanced here,
the ideal of the rule of law is well served insofar as the
exercise of political, social, and economic power in a society
is effectively tempered, constrained, and channelled to a
significant extent, so that non-arbitrary exercises of such
powers are relatively routine, while other sorts, such as
lawless, capricious, and wilful exercises of power, routinely
occur less.
Of course, states are distinctive in many ways, among
them that they have huge potential sources of power that can
help and hurt across the board. In the east European
contexts that brought me into these concerns, that is again
being made plain by new populists who in many ways are
taking up what 30 years ago had seemed to have been
decisively laid down: ideologies and practices designed to
laud and serve the arbitrary exercise of power. Nothing that
is happening there suggests that the state is dead, and I have
sought elsewhere to examine why it has been so easy to make
it yet again maliciously alive.84
So nothing I have said is intended to suggest that states
and law are unimportant, either as sources of problems or of
solutions to them. However, some of it might perhaps help us
to see their (variable) importance in perspective, and give
due weight both to other sources of power that might need
tempering, and to other entities, institutions, and social
groups that might need to be enlisted in that cause.
Rather than presume to find complex, sometimes
unprecedented sources of challenge likely to arise in coming
years, in axiomatically predetermined locations, and respond
with items from pre-packaged laundry lists, we might better
start by asking: what’s at stake? What’s the point? If the
stakes seem high, the point important, responses will need
to be sought. Here lawyers and philosophers have a role but

84. Martin Krygier, The Challenge of Institutionalisation: Post-Communist
“Transitions”, Populism and the Rule of Law, EUR. CONST. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript on file with author).
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not always a primary one. Key insights will need to be sought
from social theorists and investigators, prominent among
them theorists and investigators such as John Braithwaite
and others assembled in this issue and by and in the Baldy
Center. A lawyer or ivory tower legal theorist, perhaps this
lawyer and theorist, might say to such folk, “arbitrary power
seems a bit of a problem. Could you check out what might be
a solution?” If the answer comes back—”it all depends”—we
should recognise that as a counsel of wisdom not an
admission of defeat.

